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An	Invidious	Position?	The	Public	Dance	of	the	Promiscuous	Partisan	
By	Dennis	C.	Grube	
Sir	James	Stephen	was	a	distinguished	under-secretary	of	state	at	the	British	Colonial	
Office	from	1836	to	1847.		In	1854	he	was	asked	for	his	views	on	the	idea	expressed	in	the	
Northcote-Trevelyan	report	that	civil	servants	should	be	selected	on	merit	through	
competitive	examination	rather	than	through	the	system	of	patronage	that	then	prevailed.		
He	was	against	the	plan,	not	because	of	its	lack	of	logical	appeal,	but	because	he	could	see	
no	prospect	of	people	actually	being	drawn	towards	a	career	in	the	Civil	Service.	
The	money	to	be	earned	is	the	solitary	attraction.		A	clerk	in	a	Public	Office	
may	not	even	dream	of	fame	to	be	acquired	in	that	capacity.		He	labours	in	
an	obscurity	as	profound	as	it	is	unavoidable.		His	official	character	is	
absorbed	in	that	of	his	superior.		He	must	devote	all	his	talents,	and	all	his	
learning,	to	measures,	some	of	which	he	will	assuredly	disapprove,	without	
having	the	slightest	power	to	prevent	them;	and	to	some	of	which	he	will	
most	essentially	contribute,	without	having	any	share	whatever	in	the	credit	
of	them.1	
If,	(by	some	miracle!),	people	of	real	ability	did	happen	to	decide	it	was	worth	taking	
the	test	to	become	a	civil	servant,	Stephen	was	sure	that	they	would	‘not	usually	be	the	kind	
of	man	wanted.’		The	brightest	people	would	simply	be	too	self	reliant	and	resourceful.	
Excellent	gifts	for	a	combatant	in	the	open	fields	of	professional	competition,	
but	gifts	ill	suited,	and	even	inconvenient,	to	one	who	is	to	be	entombed	for	
life	as	a	clerk	in	a	Public	Office	in	Downing	Street.		Why	invite	an	athlete	into	
a	theatre,	where	no	combat,	and	no	applause,	and	no	reward,	awaits	him?2		
Of	course,	despite	such	objections,	the	Northcote	Trevelyan	report’s	commitment	to	
meritocracy	enforced	by	examination	was	ultimately	embraced,	and	the	report	is	still	hailed	
today	as	forming	the	foundation	stone	for	ideas	of	what	a	Westminster	civil	service	should	
embody.		But	the	obscurity	or	anonymity	of	which	Sir	James	wrote	has	played	a	central	role	
in	the	life	of	Westminster	system	public	servants	ever	since.		And	this	anonymity	included	
even	those	at	the	very	top	of	the	Civil	Service	hierarchy.		Throughout	the	twentieth	century,	
the	all-powerful	mandarins	who	wielded	immense	influence	at	the	centre	of	government	
were	largely	unknown	to	the	wider	public.		To	quote	Peter	Hennessy	from	the	2011	BBC	
documentary	The	Secret	World	of	Whitehall,	‘they	were	scarcely	household	names	in	their	
own	household’.		With,	as	Stephens	would	put	it,	‘no	combat,	and	no	applause,	and	no	
reward’	–	other	than	a	quietly	bestowed	knighthood	–	such	mandarins	diligently	went	about	
their	work	behind	the	scenes.	
Things	have	changed.		The	environment	in	which	senior	public	servants	work	today	is	
fundamentally	different.		A	24/7	news	media	with	a	voracious	appetite	and	attack-dog	
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instincts	provides	a	ceaseless	stream	of	electronic	and	print-based	communication,	
incorporating	video	and	audio	that	can	immediately	bring	mistakes	to	life.		The	advent	of	
forums	such	as	Senate	committee	hearings	in	Australia	and	select	committees	in	the	UK	
have	seen	public	servants	brought	before	MPs	to	publicly	answer	for	aspects	of	public	
administration.		The	advent	of	social	media	has	seen	public	service’s	embrace	the	
opportunities	of	Twitter	and	Facebook,	adopting	direct	forms	of	public	communication	that	
were	previously	simply	unavailable.		And	a	recent	study	by	Rhodes	confirms	that	
‘...nowadays,	senior	civil	servants	speak	in	public	almost	as	often	as	ministers’.3		In	short,	
public	service	leaders	are	appearing	publicly	more	often,	in	more	places,	and	to	a	wider	
range	of	audiences,	than	ever	before.	
The	question	for	scholars	and	practitioners	is:	should	we	care?		Does	it	in	fact	matter	
if	public	service	leaders	become	more	public	figures	than	they	have	previously?		The	
argument	of	this	paper	is	that	the	reason	these	changes	matter	is	because	the	traditional	
anonymity	of	the	public	service	is	linked	in	important	ways	to	the	impartiality	of	the	public	
service.		To	dispense	with	the	former	is	to	endanger	the	latter	in	ways	that	re-shape	the	
core	role	of	public	service	leaders	in	a	Westminster	system.		Once	the	views	and	advice	of	
public	servants	become	public,	it	opens	those	views	to	everyone	who	may	wish	to	comment	
upon	them.		Frank	and	fearless	advice	that	was	once	confined	to	a	private	office	becomes	
instead	a	matter	of	public	debate.		Inevitably,	this	then	leads	to	charges	of	politicization	and	
partisanship,	as	public	servants	are	attacked	for	being	too	close	to	government	policy,	or	
sometimes	for	being	seen	to	contradict	it.		It	seems	an	invidious	position.		It	is	in	fact	the	job	
of	senior	public	servants	to	be	close	to	government	policy,	to	discuss	it	with	ministers,	and	
to	seek	to	implement	it.		When	they	do	so	privately,	no	wider	perceptions	or	debates	
around	politicization	can	ensue.		But	when	those	debates	are	taken	into	the	public	domain,	
senior	public	servants	can	find	themselves	engaged	in	exactly	the	kind	of	public	‘combat’	
that	Sir	James	Stephen	felt	was	beyond	their	scope.		
The	late	Canadian	academic,	Peter	Aucoin,	argued	that	the	changes	wrought	over	
the	past	three	decades	by	New	Public	Management	are	now	giving	way	to	what	he	
characterized	as	‘New	Political	Governance’	(NPG).		Amongst	the	characteristics	of	NPG	
outlined	by	Aucoin	is	what	he	termed	‘promiscuous	partisanship’,	the	idea	that	public	
servants	are	now	expected	to	support	government	policy	with	the	same	fervor	as	if	they	
were	in	fact	partisans.		The	only	difference	being	that	they	must	then	turn	around	and	offer	
exactly	the	same	fervor	in	turn	to	the	next	government	when	a	change	of	government	
occurs.		Aucoin	saw	this	as	fundamentally	changing	the	nature	of	public	servants	from	being	
the	dispassionate	providers	of	frank	and	fearless	advice	to	becoming	public	advocates	for	
the	policies	of	the	government	of	the	day.				
The	anonymity	of	public	servants,	as	invisible	to	parliament	or	the	public,	
disappeared	some	time	ago.	In	the	environment	of	NPG,	moreover,	ministers,	
sometimes	explicitly,	usually	implicitly,	expect	those	public	servants	who	are	
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seen	and	heard	in	countless	public	forums	to	support	government	policy,	that	
is,	to	go	beyond	mere	description	and	explanation.4	
	 Aucoin	suggests	that	such	‘support	for	government	policy’	in	fact	becomes	
indistinguishable	from	a	kind	of	partisanship	that	‘goes	beyond	the	traditional	requirement	
of	loyalty	to	the	government	of	the	day.		It	substitutes	partisan	loyalty	for	impartial	loyalty’.5		
Aucoin	saw	this	kind	of	partisanship	as	happening	by	stealth,	with	official	documents,	
guidelines	and	codes	of	conduct	all	still	espousing	high	standards	of	impartiality.		Informal	
partisan	behavior,	Aucoin	argued,	takes	the	form	of	mandarins	essentially	becoming	
‘agents’	of	the	government	they	serve.	
The	expectation	is	not	that	they	engage	in	the	partisan	political	process,	for	
example,	at	elections	or	political	rallies.	Rather,	it	is	that	they	be	
promiscuously	or	serially	partisan,	that	is,	to	be	the	agents	of	the	government	
of	the	day	in	relation	to	stakeholders,	organized	interests,	citizens,	media,	
and	parliamentarians	as	they	engage	in	consultations,	service	delivery,	media	
communications,	reporting	to	parliament,	and	appearing	before	
parliamentary	committees.	Ministers	recognize	that	much	of	this	work	can	be	
conducted	without	becoming	political.	But	when	the	public	value	of	what	the	
government	is	doing	is	disputed,	they	expect	public	servants	to	rise	to	the	
challenge.	To	the	degree	that	ministers	can	expect	public	servants	to	do	so	
without	instruction,	the	culture	is	infested	with	the	norm	of	promiscuous	
partisanship.6 
The	sections	that	follow	explore	the	public	face	of	the	modern	mandarin	in	light	of	
Aucoin’s	argument	that	public	service	leaders	are	becoming	promiscuous	partisans.		I	begin	
by	outlining	the	traditional	picture	of	the	anonymous	civil	servant.		I	then	investigate	the	
evidence	for	a	shift	away	from	anonymity	by	outlining	three	short	comparative	case	studies	
of	public	comments	by	mandarins	in	Australia,	Canada,	and	the	United	Kingdom.		In	each	
case,	public	comments	led	to	perceptions	or	allegations	of	politicization	with	administrative	
leaders	being	seen	as	advocates	for	the	agenda	of	the	government	of	the	day.	
	
Anonymity	in	Westminster	Tradition	
The	Westminster	system	of	government	is	not	some	objective	standard	that	is	held	in	place	
by	rigid	institutional	boundaries,	but	rather	a	collection	of	traditions,	beliefs	and	
conventions	that	give	the	‘idea’	of	Westminster	meaning	in	the	minds	and	behaviours	of	
individual	actors.		The	convention	that	mandarins	should	remain	largely	anonymous	or	
faceless	became	part	of	Westminster	practice	over	time.		The	idea	was	not	explicitly	
mentioned	in	the	Northcote	Trevelyan	report	of	1854,	and	yet	was	seen	as	a	necessary	
corollary	of	the	principle	of	ministerial	responsibility,	as	Stephen’s	comments	about	civil	
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servants	laboring	in	obscurity	demonstrate.		It	was	in	the	twentieth	century	that	the	
principle	of	anonymity	became	an	embedded	part	of	Westminster	convention,	as	
bureaucracies	expanded	into	vast	administrative	machines	controlled	by	the	kind	of	
anonymous	‘establishment’	men	in	bowler	hats	beloved	of	caricaturists.		This	perception	of	
permanent	secretaries	as	being	too	far	removed	from	the	community	led	the	Fulton	
Committee	in	1968	to	recommend	that	conventions	of	anonymity	be	softened.	
Anonymity	is	not	only	part	of	the	mystique	of	powerful	mandarins,	it	is	also	
fundamental	to	the	workings	of	notions	of	ministerial	responsibility.	It	is	ministers	–	not	
mandarins	–	who	are	theoretically	to	be	called	to	account	for	governance	failings.	As	
Dillman	expressed	it:	‘If	a	minister	cannot	defend	the	actions	of	his	civil	servants	to	the	
satisfaction	of	Parliament	he	or	she	is	obliged	to	resign,	preserving	the	anonymity	of	the	civil	
servant’.7	The	strength	of	the	anonymity	convention	was	tested	in	Canada	in	1978	when	
Jean-Pierre	Goyer	–	then	a	Minister	–	criticized	one	of	his	officials	by	name	inside	and	
outside	the	parliament.		The	official	sued	for	libel	and	in	finding	for	the	plaintiff,	Justice	Lieff	
reiterated	that:	
It	is	a	long-standing	convention	of	parliamentary	democracy	and	the	doctrine	
of	ministerial	responsibility	which	it	encompasses	that	civil	servants	are	to	
remain	faceless	to	the	public.	Civil	servants	are	responsible	to	their	Ministers.	
Ministers,	as	elected	officials,	are	responsible	to	the	public.8				
This	kind	of	‘facelessness’	that	was	perhaps	still	possible	in	the	1970s	seems	to	have	
been	superseded	by	the	challenges	of	twenty-first	century	governance.		Modern	mandarins	
undertake	some	very	public	duties	on	behalf	of	the	departments	that	they	lead.	They	give	
speeches	and	media	statements;	they	have	individual	or	departmental	Twitter	accounts;	
they	consistently	front	parliamentary	committees	and	external	commissions	of	inquiry;	and	
in	some	cases	they	are	asked	to	head	public	inquiries	or	reviews	on	behalf	of	the	
government.	The	breadth	of	the	public	duties	expected	of	modern	public	service	leaders	is	
extensive.	Of	course,	the	fact	that	a	duty	is	performed	publicly	does	not	necessarily	mean	
that	public	servants	have	become	partisan.			
The	next	section	explores	three	case	studies	in	which	contemporary	mandarins	have	
faced	allegations	of	politicization	through	being	publicly	seen	as	too	close	to	the	agenda	of	
the	government	of	the	day.		In	all	three	cases,	the	difficulties	for	public	servants	arose	not	
simply	from	the	content	of	their	policy	advice,	but	from	its	public	nature.		The	media,	
opposition	parties,	and	external	commentators	were	all	able	to	offer	their	assessments	on	
the	performance	of	public	servants	because	their	comments	became	part	of	the	public	
debate.	
	
Australia:	Martin	Parkinson	on	the	Australian	Economy	
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In	May	2013,	Australian	Treasury	Secretary	Martin	Parkinson	faced	accusations	from	the	
Liberal	Party	–	then	in	opposition	–	that	Treasury	was	producing	figures	in	order	to	meet	the	
political	needs	of	the	Labor	Government.		In	particular,	opposition	shadow	ministers	took	
issue	with	budget	forecasts	of	the	revenues	that	could	be	expected	to	flow	from	the	carbon	
and	mining	taxes.		Shadow	Assistant	Treasurer,	Mathias	Cormann	was	quoted	as	saying:	‘I	
don’t	believe	for	one	minute	that	the	Treasury	left	to	its	own	devices	would	have	come	up	
with	some	of	the	unbelievable	assumptions	that	Wayne	Swan	and	Penny	Wong	have	based	
their	budget	figures	on’.9	
	 In	his	post-budget	address	to	the	Australian	Business	Economists	in	Sydney,	
Parkinson	publicly	defended	the	integrity	of	his	department	and	the	figures	it	provided	to	
government.	
Let	me	be	very	clear:	Treasury	does	not	provide	the	government	with	a	range	
of	numbers;	Treasury	provides	its	best	professional	estimate	to	the	
government	...	It	is	up	to	the	government	of	the	day	–	and	this	applies	back	
through	history	–	to	do	what	it	wishes	with	those	forecasts.10	
It	was	not	the	first	time	that	Parkinson	had	been	criticized	by	opposition	MPs.		In	2012	the	
then	Shadow	Treasurer,	Joe	Hockey,	alleged	that	the	Treasury	had	breached	its	impartiality	
obligations	by	providing	the	government	with	unflattering	costings	of	opposition	tax	
policies.		On	that	occasion,	Parkinson	posted	a	response	on	the	Treasury	website,	refuting	
the	allegation	and	defending	his	department.	
When	the	Coalition	parties	won	the	September	2013	election,	one	of	Prime	Minister	
Abbott’s	first	announcements	was	that	he	was	sacking	several	prominent	departmental	
secretaries.		This	included	Parkinson,	who	was	to	be	kept	on	for	the	transition	period	up	to	
the	next	budget	but	was	to	be	replaced	within	a	year.		According	to	media	reports,	there	
was	a	perception	amongst	some	in	the	Coalition	that	Parkinson	had	been	too	close	to	the	
policies	of	the	previous	Labor	Government.			
Ironically,	only	half	a	year	later	Parkinson	would	be	accused	of	being	too	close	to	the	
Coalition	Government	when	he	gave	a	speech	to	the	Association	of	Mining	and	Exploration	
Companies	in	Perth	on	2	July	2014.		In	his	speech,	Parkinson	included	a	reflection	on	the	
idea	of	‘fairness’.	‘It	is	one	thing	to	argue	that	reform	proposals	should	be	designed	with	
fairness	in	mind	–	nobody	would	disagree	with	that.	It	is	quite	another	to	invoke	vague	
notions	of	fairness	to	oppose	all	reform’.11		This	reflection	was	interpreted	by	the	opposition	
–	now	the	Labor	Party	–	as	being	an	attack	on	their	disagreement	with	parts	of	the	recent	
budget.		Opposition	Leader	Bill	Shorten	referred	to	the	comments	in	parliament,	and	
stressed	that	the	Labor	Party’s	position	was	not	based	on	‘vague	ideas	of	fairness’.		The	ABC	
quoted	one	senior	source	as	saying	‘Dr	Parkinson	sees	himself	as	a	political	player’.12	
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	 Extraordinarily,	in	the	space	of	a	few	short	months,	Parkinson	faced	allegations	from	
both	major	parties	that	he	was	supporting	the	political	agenda	of	the	other.		It	is	of	course	
no	coincidence	that	the	criticisms	came	on	each	occasion	from	the	party	that	was	in	
opposition.		If	the	public	service	exists	to	serve	the	government	of	the	day,	then	why	did	
Parkinson’s	support	of	each	government	that	he	served	attract	such	controversy?		It’s	not	
because	he	was	any	more	or	less	‘promiscuous’	than	previous	mandarins,	many	of	whom	
have	served	both	political	parties	with	equal	distinction	when	in	government.		Nor	is	there	
much	evidence	in	his	comments	of	any	kind	of	overt	partisanship.		The	fact	that	the	Treasury	
Secretary	does	his	job	in	a	way	that	attracts	criticism	from	the	opposition	or	the	media	does	
not	necessarily	mean	that	he	is	being	partisan	or	has	been	politicized.		What	is	changing	is	
not	partisanship,	but	perceptions	of	partisanship.13		It	is	the	public	nature	of	the	comments	
of	public	service	leaders	that	allow	them	to	be	assessed	through	partisan	lenses.		I’ll	return	
to	the	importance	of	perceptions	of	partisanship	in	the	discussion	section	to	follow.							
	
Canada:	Wayne	Wouters	and	Kevin	Page	
Kevin	Page	was	Canada’s	Parliamentary	Budget	Officer	(PBO)	between	2008	and	2013.		His	
was	an	independent	statutory	role	tasked,	inter	alia,	with	estimating	the	financial	costs	of	
various	government	policies	and	programs.		Page	became	something	of	a	controversial	
figure	for	his	willingness	to	consistently	contradict	government	ministers	and	official	papers	
in	their	estimates	of	policy	costs.		As	an	independent	statutory	officer,	his	public	
disagreements	with	government	policy	are	not	an	example	of	traditionally	anonymous	
public	servants	taking	on	a	more	public	role.		The	very	nature	of	the	position	of	
Parliamentary	Budget	Officer	makes	it	a	public	role	in	which	independent	analysis	is	likely	to	
sometimes	produce	results	that	might	be	disputed	by	the	political	arm	of	government.		The	
interest	for	this	paper	is	how	the	traditional	head	of	the	Canadian	public	service,	the	Clerk	of	
the	Privy	Council	Wayne	Wouters,	was	perceived	as	contributing	to	partisan	disagreements	
with	Kevin	Page’s	work.	
	 The	Canadian	Budget	of	2012	was	focused	by	the	Harper	Government	on	tackling	
Canada’s	budget	deficit	with	billions	of	dollars	in	projected	savings.		Page,	in	his	role	as	
Parliamentary	Budget	Officer,	sought	specific	details	from	the	government	and	deputy	
ministers	(the	equivalent	of	UK	permanent	secretaries)	about	how	departments	planned	to	
reach	their	fiscal	targets	under	the	budget.		As	Clerk	of	the	Privy	Council,	Wayne	Wouters	
was	portrayed	in	the	media	as	being	in	a	battle	with	Kevin	Page	to	withhold	information	and	
was	later	accused	of	having	politicized	his	role	in	seeking	to	protect	the	government	from	
Page’s	requests	for	fiscal	detail.					
	 		In	a	2014	report	by	think	tank	Canada	2020,	Wouters	was	portrayed	as	having	taken	
on	the	role	of	publicly	defending	the	Harper	Government	in	a	partisan	manner.		The	
allegations	of	partisanship	centred	around	a	letter	that	Wouters	sent	to	Page	in	September	
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2012,	in	which	he	refused	to	pass	on	some	information	and	defended	the	government’s	
need	to	provide	‘credible’	deficit	reduction	measures.		The	Canada	2020	report,	authored	by	
Prof.	Ralph	Heintzman	at	the	University	of	Ottawa,	argued	that:	
The	Clerk	of	the	Privy	Council	not	only	took	on	the	highly	political	role	of	
spokesperson	for	blocking	parliamentary	oversight	of	public	finance	–	a	
political	role	that	should	never	be	assumed	by	a	professional	public	service	in	
a	parliamentary	democracy.	He	did	so	in	what	can	only	be	described	as	a	
forthrightly	partisan	manner.14	
	
The	Heintzman	paper	received	considerable	media	publicity,	and	the	Privy	Council	Office	
defended	Wouters’	actions,	with	a	spokesman	reported	as	saying	that	Wouters	had	
communicated	not	‘on	behalf	of	government,	but	rather	as	head	of	the	public	service...’15	
Was	Wouters	acting	in	a	partisan	manner	or	was	he	merely	doing	his	job?		Under	the	
terms	of	the	legislation	governing	the	work	of	the	Parliamentary	Budget	Office	deputy	
ministers	are	tasked	with	providing	information	to	the	PBO	upon	request	(section	79.3	
Parliament	of	Canada	Act).		In	other	words,	the	legislation	envisages	the	passing	of	
information	as	taking	place	between	administrative	leaders	rather	than	the	political	leaders	
of	the	government.		There	were	arguments	about	whether	Wouters	had	the	power	to	
respond	collectively	on	behalf	of	deputy	ministers,	but	the	fact	that	the	PBO	was	not	happy	
with	Wouters’	stance	does	not	automatically	make	him	partisan.		What	led	to	the	
perceptions	of	partisanship	was	the	public	nature	of	the	debate	between	Page	and	Wouters,	
including	public	comment	on	the	correspondence	between	the	two	men.		As	administrative	
historians	can	testify,	civil	service	files	across	the	Westminster	world	are	full	of	disputatious	
correspondence	between	departments.		The	difference	of	course	is	that	in	the	past,	such	
correspondence	seldom	saw	the	light	of	day,	and	therefore	seldom	operated	to	draw	
bureaucrats	into	the	kinds	of	public	spats	that	can	lead	to	perceptions	of	partisanship.					
	
United	Kingdom:	Nicholas	Macpherson	on	a	Scottish	Currency	
In	September	2014,	Scotland	will	vote	in	a	referendum	on	whether	it	should	secede	from	
the	United	Kingdom	to	establish	itself	as	an	independent	country.		The	lead	up	to	the	
referendum	has	seen	a	wide	ranging	debate	over	what	the	impact	of	a	‘yes’	vote	would	be	
on	things	that	Scotland	and	the	rest	of	the	UK	currently	share.		High	up	on	that	list	is	the	
currency	–	the	British	Pound	–	and	whether	it	would	be	feasible	or	desirable	for	Scotland	
and	the	rest	of	the	UK	to	maintain	a	currency	union	even	if	the	political	union	was	dissolved.		
The	British	Labour	Party,	Conservative	Party,	and	the	Liberal	Democrats,	have	all	
campaigned	against	a	‘yes’	vote,	and	the	Coalition	Government	has	sought	and	received	
policy	advice	from	the	Civil	Service	on	what	some	of	the	implications	of	a	‘yes’	vote	might	
be.	
8	
	
Dennis	C.	Grube	
	
In	February	2014,	Chancellor	of	the	Exchequer	George	Osborne	gave	a	speech	in	
Edinburgh	outlining	some	of	the	potential	challenges	and	pitfalls	should	Scotland	choose	to	
vote	for	independence.		What	made	the	speech	controversial	was	not	so	much	what	the	
Chancellor	said,	but	the	use	he	made	of	advice	he	had	received	from	the	permanent	
secretary	to	the	Treasury,	Sir	Nicholas	Macpherson.		In	his	speech,	Osborne	announced:	
‘Alongside	this	analysis	I	am	also	taking	the	exceptional	step	of	publishing	the	internal	
advice	I	have	received	from	the	Permanent	Secretary	to	the	Treasury,	Sir	Nicholas	
Macpherson’.16		Macpherson’s	advice	was	both	clear	and	clearly	worded,	leading	to	wide	
coverage	in	all	sections	of	the	British	media.	
Currency	unions	between	sovereign	states	are	fraught	with	difficulty.		They	
require	extraordinary	commitment,	and	a	genuine	desire	to	see	closer	union	
between	the	people	involved…I	would	advise	strongly	against	a	currency	
union	as	currently	advocated,	if	Scotland	were	to	vote	for	independence.17	
The	advice	went	on	to	reflect	critically	on	fiscal	policy	in	Scotland.	
Finally,	Treasury	analysis	suggests	that	fiscal	policy	in	Scotland	and	the	rest	of	
UK	would	become	increasingly	misaligned	in	the	medium	term.	Of	course,	if	
the	Scottish	Government	had	demonstrated	a	strong	commitment	to	a	
rigorous	fiscal	policy	in	recent	months,	it	might	be	possible	to	discount	this.	
But	recent	spending	and	tax	commitments	by	the	Scottish	Government	point	
in	the	opposite	direction,	as	do	their	persistently	optimistic	projections	of	
North	Sea	revenues,	which	are	at	odds	not	just	with	the	Treasury	but	with	
the	Office	of	Budget	Responsibility	and	other	credible	independent	
forecasters.18		
In	response,	Scottish	First	Minister	Alex	Salmond	suggested	in	a	TV	interview	that	UK	
civil	servants	were	merely	following	the	political	line	of	their	ministers.	
Treasury	civil	servants	do	what	they	are	told	by	George	Osborne…Sir	Nicholas	
Macpherson,	in	making	the	unprecedented	publication	of	this	advice,	I	think	
he	might	come	to	regret	that	step	because	he	will	be	asked	for	his	advice	on	
other	things	like	the	consequences	of	withdrawal	from	the	EU,	for	
example…At	one	stage	he	actually	questions	the	fiscal…I’m	afraid	we	are	in	a	
situation	where	the	UK	government	departments	and	civil	servants	do	what	
they	are	told	by	their	political	masters.19	
		 Macpherson	himself,	appearing	before	a	hearing	of	the	Public	Administration	
Committee	of	the	House	of	Commons	in	April	2014,	insisted	that	he	had	not	been	politicized	
and	that	it	had	been	his	decision	to	allow	publication	of	his	advice.		He	asserted	that	civil	
servants	had	a	duty	to	‘serve	the	national	interest’	and	that	‘…if	publishing	advice	could	
strengthen	the	credibility	of	the	Government’s	position,	it	was	my	duty	to	do	it’.20		But	
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Macpherson	also	stressed	that	he	saw	this	as	an	exceptional	case,	and	that	‘this	is	not	
something	I	would	want	to	make	a	habit	of.’21			
	 Macpherson	stressed	in	the	hearing	that	he	has	served	governments	of	both	political	
persuasions	and	has	always	sought	to	do	so	impartially.		So	whilst	that	makes	him	as	
promiscuous	as	all	other	civil	servants,	could	his	actions	on	this	occasion	be	construed	as	
partisan	or	simply	as	fulfilling	his	duty	as	Treasury	Secretary?		All	defenders	of	the	Civil	
Service,	both	practitioners	and	academics,	would	support	the	idea	that	civil	servants	should	
give	frank	and	fearless	advice.		They	should	have	no	hesitation	in	speaking	‘truth	to	power’	
in	Wildavsky’s	phrase.		In	this	case,	Macpherson	did	so,	and	did	so	in	very	clear	language.		
The	advice	certainly	fitted	well	with	the	political	view	of	the	Chancellor	of	the	Exchequer,	
but	does	that	immediately	make	it	partisan?		The	idea	that	civil	servants	should	disagree	
with	their	ministers	on	every	point	simply	to	avoid	being	seen	as	partisan	is	patently	absurd.		
What	caused	the	difficulty	in	this	case	was	that	the	advice	was	made	public,	and	used	
politically	by	the	Chancellor	in	his	speech	in	Edinburgh.		It	immediately	dragged	the	Treasury	
Secretary	into	the	public	limelight,	where	his	views	were	then	open	to	the	perceptions	of	
others	who	saw	them	as	partisan	because	they	had	been	used	for	political	ends	by	the	
Chancellor.		
	
Anonymity,	Impartiality	and	Westminster	Tradition	
My	goal	here	is	not	to	provide	an	assessment	of	whether	Parkinson,	Wouters	or	
Macpherson	overstepped	their	roles	or	in	actuality	acted	in	partisan	ways.		The	cases	are	
illustrative	only	of	the	fact	that	when	senior	public	servants	communicate	publicly	–	be	it	
through	speeches	or	published	advice	or	some	other	format	–	their	actions	are	scrutinized	
through	a	public	lens.		Their	advice	is	assessed	by	a	wide	variety	of	commentators	who	then	
offer	public	judgements,	which	can	lead	to	allegations	of	partisanship.		Policy	advice	given	
privately	can	always	be	seen	as	neutral,	whereas	all	public	statements	will	be	read	through	
whichever	lens	external	observers	wish	to	place	upon	them.		This	places	public	servants	in	
the	challenging	position	that	although	they	may	simply	be	offering	frank	and	fearless	advice	
in	the	best	traditions	of	the	Westminster	system,	they	may	be	perceived	as	having	
politicized	themselves.		It	illustrates	the	vital	role	that	the	Westminster	tradition	of	public	
service	anonymity	plays	in	buttressing	the	equally	important	Westminster	tradition	of	public	
service	non-partisanship.	
The	cases	presented	here	help	to	refine	Aucoin’s	conceptualization	of	‘promiscuous	
partisanship’	by	demonstrating	how	contested	the	idea	of	what	constitutes	partisanship	
actually	is.		In	the	three	cases	examined,	Parkinson,	Wouters	and	Macpherson	were	
certainly	promiscuous	in	the	sense	that	all	three	served	the	government	of	the	day	whilst	
having	all	served	previous	governments	of	a	different	political	stripe.		Such	promiscuity	is	
hardly	controversial	–	it	is	in	fact	in	keeping	with	the	best	traditions	of	a	Westminster	
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system	civil	service.		Yet,	what	is	beyond	doubt	is	that	in	all	three	cases	a	public	servant	was	
able	to	attract	a	significant	amount	of	controversy	in	a	way	that	led	to	accusations	of	their	
politicization.	
What	has	changed	is	not	that	public	service	leaders	have	suddenly	become	partisan,	
but	rather	that	they	have	recently	become	‘public’,	allowing	for	perceptions	of	partisanship	
to	emerge.		Senior	mandarins	work	at	the	interface	of	politics	and	administration.		Their	job	
is	self-evidently	not	removed	from	the	politics	which	surrounds	it.		That	is	why	only	
anonymity	can	protect	them	from	perceptions	that	they	are	partisan	or	political	in	the	
statements	they	make.		If	Westminster	systems	are	moving	towards	expecting	public	
servants	to	play	a	more	public	role	–	and	empirically	this	seems	undeniable	–	then	some	
reconsideration	of	what	the	Westminster	ideal	expects	of	administrative	leaders	is	required.		
Westminster	tradition	and	convention	needs	to	catch	up	with	the	new	realities	of	practice	
and	evolve	some	guidelines	that	allow	public	servants	to	fulfill	their	public	roles	without	
being	targeted	with	allegations	of	partisanship.	
		 It	may	be	that	the	demands	of	modern	governance	simply	will	not	allow	a	system	of	
relative	anonymity	for	senior	officials	to	be	maintained.		In	the	age	of	social	media	and	24/7	
news	cycles	public	servants	cannot	insulate	themselves	from	forms	of	communication	that	
have	become	part	of	how	they	interact	with	the	community.		It	may	be	that	the	decline	in	
anonymity	is	simply	part	of	the	next	evolution	of	the	ever-malleable	Westminster	system	of	
government.		But	it	is	important	to	assess	the	extent	to	which	that	decline	in	anonymity	will	
also	compromise	the	commitment	to	non-partisan	impartiality	that	is	the	defining	feature	of	
permanent	bureaucracies	in	the	Westminster	tradition.		Certainly	at	senior	leadership	level,	
public	servants	who	gain	a	public	profile	become	a	natural	magnet	for	those	who	wish	to	
examine	their	public	comments	for	evidence	of	partisanship	or	politicisation.			
The	emergence	of	mandarins	as	participants	in	public	debates	is	a	significant	change	
from	Westminster	tradition.		Further	research	is	needed	to	establish	the	extent	of	this	
change,	what	is	driving	the	change	at	both	a	political	and	administrative	level,	and	what	it	
may	mean	for	the	future	leadership	roles	we	expect	public	servants	to	play.		For	example,	
what	lessons	can	Westminster	draw	from	other	systems	of	government	that	have	long-
established	bureaucracies	–	such	as	in	Europe	and	the	USA	–	for	how	to	balance	the	public	
roles	of	administrative	leaders	with	a	commensurate	commitment	to	protecting	their	non-
partisan	status?			
The	important	thing	is	that	a	change	towards	a	more	partisan	form	of	support	is	not	
achieved	simply	by	stealth.		Either	conventions	need	to	be	revised	to	allow	senior	public	
servants	to	exercise	a	public	face	whilst	protecting	them	from	being	drawn	into	political	
debates	by	MPs	seeking	to	attack	the	government;	Or	the	decision	must	be	made	to	restrict	
public	comments	by	bureaucratic	leaders	and	the	publication	of	their	advice	by	ministers.		A	
third	option	is	that	governments	make	the	conscious	decision	that	it	is	in	fact	desirable	for	
public	service	leaders	to	serve	as	public	advocates	on	behalf	of	the	government	of	the	day.		
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The	role	of	various	statutory	officers	shows	that	it	is	quite	possible	to	have	strongly	
independent	public	voices	that	scrutinize	government	performance	in	a	non-partisan	way.		
Extending	such	a	robust	‘right	to	comment’	to	the	administrative	leaders	of	government	
departments	would	be	full	of	difficulties	around	lines	of	accountability	and	responsibility,	
but	these	are	perhaps	not	insurmountable.	
	 None	of	the	options	is	straightforward	or	easy	to	implement,	and	in	classic	
Westminster	style	the	answer	may	well	be	some	kind	of	compromise	between	the	three	
options	outlined.		But	in	the	absence	of	new	settled	conventions,	claims	of	partisanship	will	
continue	to	be	leveled	at	those	public	service	leaders	who	undertake	acts	of	public	
leadership.		Over	time	this	can	only	serve	to	lift	the	public	service	as	an	institution	further	
into	the	middle	of	political	debates,	undermining	its	ability	to	present	itself	as	a	permanent	
and	impartial	servant	of	the	nation	whose	traditional	Westminster	role	needs	to	be	
protected.	
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